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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
KIRK VAUGHAN KELSEY,

Case No. 20050033-CA

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a jury conviction for assault by a prisoner, a third degree
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-102 and 76-5-102.5 (West 2004).
This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Is the probative value of defendant's threats to kill the assault victim and to
sexually assault and kill a witness substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issue, or misleading the jury?
The decision to admit evidence under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221,1227 (Utah 1989). See also State
v. Lindgren, 910 P.2d 1268, 1271 (Utah App. 1996). Because the decision to admit or
exclude evidence under rule 403 lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, "[the

reviewing] court will only conclude the trial court abused its discretion if the ruling 'was
beyond the limits of reasombility.'"Lindgren, 910 P.2d at 1271 (quoting State v. Hamilton,
827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-5-102 (West 2004):

(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily
injury to another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or
violence, to do bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that
causes bodily injury to another or creates a substantial risk of
bodily injury to another. .. .
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 76-5-102.5 (West 2004):

Any prisoner who commits assault, intending to cause bodily
injury, is guilty of a felony of the third degree.
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Charge. Defendant was charged with assault by a prisoner, a third degree felony, in
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-5-102 and 76-5-102.5 (West 2004). R5-6.
Conviction. A jury convicted defendant as charged. R308.

2

Sentence. The trial court imposed the indeterminate statutory term of zero to five
years. R320.
Timely notice of appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R333.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS1
On 24 March 2004, defendant and Tyler Murdock were prisoners in the Cache County
jail. TT: 100. When a deputy opened defendant's cell to talk about some screaming he had
heard over the jail intercom system, defendant stepped out, turned to his left, called Murdock
a "punk ass jail bitch," and punched him in the right cheek. TT: 131; see TT: 113, 130.
*

*

*

Earlier in the day, as Deputy Stewart made his rounds through cell block A, defendant
complained that his toilet was not working properly. TT:100, 127. Defendant also called
into the control room through the intercom system in his cell and told Deputy Toon about the
problem. TT:100. When Deputy Stewart returned to the control room, Deputy Toon
reported that he had turned the water on and off in an attempt to fix defendant's toilet.
TT:100, 127. Deputy Stewart noticed that the intercom was still turned on in defendant's
cell. TT: 127. The two deputies then heard loud yelling and screaming through the intercom.
TT:100, 128. Deputy Stewart heard someone saying that he was drowning. TT:128.

]

The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See State v.
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 2, 12 P.3d 92. Because the transcript volumes are
unnumbered, they are cited as follows: Trial Transcript (TT:
); Motion Hearing
Transcript (MHT:
).
3

"You punk ass jail bitch "
Deputy Stewart went back to cell block A to investigate. TT:100, 128. He found
Murdock sitting on a water storage device in the hallway of cell block A watching television.
TT:110, 112, 129, 147. Defendant was using his toilet. TT:128, 148. Deputy Stewart told
the inmates that they "weren't behaving like decent grown adults." TT: 128. He then asked
who was yelling and screaming. Id. When no one responded, Deputy Stewart informed
defendant that when he was finished using the toilet, he was going to take defendant up front
to talk about who was screaming. Id. Deputy Stewart "knew that if [defendant] wasn't the
one screaming he knew who was screaming, because his cell was the only cell [with the
intercom turned on]." TT: 149. Deputy Stewart walked to the back of the cell block to give
defendant some privacy and to ask the other inmates about the screaming. TT: 112,130,148.
When Deputy Stewart returned to defendant's cell, he asked Deputy Toon, who was
monitoring the video feed of cell block A in the control room, to open the cell door. TT: 101,
130. As the door slid open, defendant stepped out, turned to his left, called Murdock a
"punch ass jail bitch," and punched Murdock in the right cheek. TT:131; see TT:113, 130.
The attack left Murdock with a reddish bruise on his right cheek. TT132, 161; see also
State's Exh.## 2-3.
"He told me that he was going to shank my ass,. . . kill Mr. Murdock, "
and "that he was going to have anal sex with me until I died"
After defendant punched Murdock, Deputy Stewart stepped between them. TT: 134135. He told defendant to turn around and put his hands behind his back. TT:135. At first
4

defendant refused, but he eventually complied. Id. Deputy Stewart then called the control
room to open the door to cell block A and for backup. Id. Once Deputy Stewart and
defendant were out of cell block A, Deputy Stewart told defendant to start walking toward
booking. Id. Defendant told Deputy Stewart that he was going to "shank [Deputy Stewart's]
ass." TT: 136. Defendant also said that he was going to kill Murdock, that he knew where
Deputy Stewart lived, and that he was "going to have anal sex with [Deputy Stewart] until
[Deputy Stewart] died." Id. Defendant made these threats about fifteen seconds after
assaulting Murdock. TT: 160.
Defendant threatened "to cut up Mr. Murdock. . . into little pieces"
When Deputy Stewart and defendant arrived at booking, defendant was placed in a
holding cell. TT:138. Defendant was "very aggressive." Id. He pounded on the door and
continued his threats against Deputy Stewart and Murdock. Id. Defendant said he was going
to "cut up Mr. Murdock on [Deputy Stewart's] front lawn into little pieces," and reiterated
his threat to have anal sex with Deputy Stewart until he died. TT: 136, 138. Defendant also
"stuffed his clothing into the toilet, which plugged it, and began flushing it continuously,
which... overflowed the holding cell." TT: 13 8. Officers covered the window of the holding
cell because defendant would "instantly become enraged and mad" whenever he saw Deputy
Stewart. TT:139.
After defendant was placed in the holding cell, Deputy Stewart went back to cell block
A and brought Murdock to booking. TT: 173. Deputy Anderson interviewed Murdock. Id.
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Although Murdock admitted that defendant had struck him, Murdock did not want to press
charges or cooperate with the investigation. TT: 173-174. However, he did tell Deputy
Anderson that he was the one who had been screaming, not defendant. Id. Murdock had not
confessed to the screaming earlier because he did not like defendant. TT: 174.
At trial, Murdock was called as a witness by defendant. TT:192. According to
Murdock, he always had red cheeks related to acne, defendant's fingers merely "touch[ed]"
or "rubbed55 his right cheek, and he felt no pain. TT: 194-195, 200. On cross-examination,
Murdock acknowledged that he feared being labeled a snitch. TT:202; see also TT:200.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly admitted evidence of defendant's post-assault threats to kill
Murdock and to sexually assault and kill Deputy Stewart. The threat evidence was relevant
and highly probative of defendant's disputed intent to seriously injure Murdock when he
assaulted him moments earlier. Relevant evidence is presumptively admissible unless it has
an unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead the jury. Defendant's
threats—though crude and outrageous—were not so unfairly prejudicial as to reverse the
presumption favoring admissibility. Further, the probative value of the threat evidence was
not outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. First, evidence the threats were made
within minutes—if not seconds—of the assault was strong and shed critical light on
defendant's intent to injure Murdock. Second, the State's need for the threat evidence was
high, given that the physical evidence was minimal, and that the reluctant victim ultimately

6

testified on behalf of defendant and sought to minimize defendant's conduct. Finally, the
danger that evidence of defendant's threats would unfairly prejudice the jury was relatively
minor. The trial court's admissibility ruling should thus be upheld.
ARGUMENT
THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF DEFENDANT'S THREATS TO KILL
MURDOCK AND TO SEXUALLY ASSAULT AND KILL DEPUTY
STEWART IS NOT SUBSTANTIALLY OUTWEIGHED BY THE
DANGER OF UNFAIR PREJUDICE, CONFUSION OF THE ISSUE, OR
MISLEADING THE JURY
Defendant challenges the admission of evidence that he threatened Murdock and
Deputy Stewart following his assault on Murdock. Defendant grudgingly acknowledges that
his post-assault threats have some relevance, but asserts that the probative value of evidence
that he threatened Murdock and Deputy Stewart was outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice and thus should have been excluded under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence. Aplt.
Br. at 8, 10. Because defendant's threats were highly probative of his disputed intent, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the evidence.
Proceedings below. Before trial, defendant moved under rule 403 to exclude the
threats he made against Deputy Stewart immediately after assaulting Murdock. Rl 10-12.
During oral argument, defense counsel further moved to exclude defendant's post-assault
threats against Murdock.2 See MHT:29. The trial court denied defendant's motion, ruling

2

Defendant did not include in his written motion in limine the threats against
Murdock because they were not included in Deputy Stewart's report. See MHT:29.
7

that the threats against both Deputy Stewart and Murdock were probative of defendant's
intent:
Threats to Tyler Murdock, to start with, it strikes me are remarkably
probative. Remarkably. Certainly they're prejudicial against [defendant].
They wouldn't be offered if they weren't. That's why they are used because
they're prejudicial.
They are remarkably probative as to whether or not the assault occurred
and the mens rea, if you will, of the defendant at the time. Threats to the
officer may well relate to the same exact thing. If your client is in a mind set
of outrage and threatening and hostile, that kind of mind set is demonstrative
to the jury as to what may have been the situation a few minutes earlier when
the alleged assault occurred.
MHT:31; see also TT:182 (reiterating earlier ruling) (copies of the trial court's oral rulings
are attached in the addendum).
At trial, Deputies Anderson, Stewart, and Toon testified regarding defendant's postassault threats. SeeTT: 102-03,136-38,172. Approximately fifteen seconds after assaulting
Murdock, defendant threatened to "shank [Deputy Stewart's] ass," kill Murdock, and to
"have anal sex with [Deputy Stewart] until [Deputy Stewart] died." TT:136, 160. When
defendant arrived in booking, he threatened to cut Murdock up into "little pieces" on Deputy
Stewart's front yard. TT:136.
Defense counsel objected to the post-assault threats throughout the trial. See TT:135,
138-139, 182. The trial court denied the objections, based on its pretrial ruling. Id.

8

A.

Defendant does not and could not assert that the threat evidence
was so prejudicial as to reverse the presumption in favor of its
admissibility.

Under rule 403, relevant evidence may be excluded "if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." Utah R. Evid. 403. Because
"[i]n a broad sense, almost all evidence is [prejudicial]," the fact that evidence is prejudicial
does not automatically render it inadmissible. Robinson v. All-Star Delivery, Inc., 1999 UT
109, f 28, 992 P.2d 969. Indeed, "[i]f [r]ule 403 simply prohibited prejudicial evidence,
hardly any evidence would be admissible." Id. Thus, the rule only bars detrimental evidence
which may create an unfair prejudice against defendant. Id.; see also State v. Kooyman, 2005
UT App 222, \ 26, 112 P.3d 1252 ("[Ejvidence is not unfairly prejudicial simply because it
is detrimental to a party's case.") (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States
v. Magleby, 241 F.3d 1306, 1315 (10th Cir. 2001)).
Accordingly, under rule 403, relevant evidence is presumed admissible unless it "'has
an unusual propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead the jury.5" State v. Jaeger,
1999 UT 1, If 18, 973 P.2d 404 (quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1221 (Utah 1993)
(additional citations omitted)). The presumption is reversed in favor of inadmissibility only
for evidence that is "'uniquely subject to being used to distort the deliberative process and
skew a trial's outcome.'" Dunn, 850 P.2d atl222 (quoting State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221,
1229 (Utah 1989)). The Utah Supreme Court has identified only three categories of evidence
that are so prejudicial as to reverse the presumption. See State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239,
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1256-57 (Utah 1988); State v. White, 880 P.2d 18,21 (Utah App. 1994). The three categories
are (1) gruesome photographs of a homicide victim's corpse; (2) a rape victim's past sexual
activities with someone other than the accused; and (3) statistical evidence of matters not
susceptible to quantitative analysis, such as witness veracity. See White, 880 P.2d at 21.
Here, defendant's threats to injure and kill Murdock and to sexually assault and kill
Deputy Stewart, see TT: 102-103,136-38,172, do not fall into one of the three categories of
presumptively prejudicial evidence. The threats are not gruesome, nor are they statistical
evidence incapable of quantitative analysis. See White, 880 P.2d at 21. Although defendant
did threaten to sexually assault Deputy Stewart until the deputy died, that threat is not
presumptively prejudicial because it does not go to a rape victim's pas sexual activities with
someone other than the accused. Id. Thus, evidence of defendant's threats is presumed
admissible unless defendant can show that the relevance of the threat evidence "is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury." Utah R. Evid. 403.
B.

Defendant has not and cannot show that the probative value
of his threats was substantially outweighed by their potential
for unfair prejudice.

Defendant has not and cannot make this showing here. The trial court acted within
its discretion in determining that defendant's threats—made immediately after the assault on
Murdock—were highly probative of defendant's intent and that the probative value was not
substantially outweighed by any potential for unfair prejudice. See MHT:31; TT: 182.
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In determining the admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence challenged under
rule 403, several factors are considered,
including the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other crime,
the similarities between the crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed
between the crimes, the need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof,
and the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to
overmastering hostility.
State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, Tf 29, 993 P.2d 837 (quoting State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291,
295-296 (Utah 1988) (quoting E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence §190, at 565 (3d ed.
1984))).
Applying these factors here, the trial court's admissibility ruling is well-supported.
The threat evidence was highly probative of defendant's intent while the risk of unfair
prejudice was low. Id. First, evidence that defendant made the threats was strong—three
different deputies heard defendant's threats and recounted them at trial. See, e.g., TT:103,
118, 136-137, 160, 172. Second, defendant's threats—made moments after he assaulted
Murdock—show his angry state of mind and intent to seriously injure Murdock, if not
Deputy Stewart. Id. Third, the need for the threat evidence was "very high." DeCorso, 1999
UT 57, Tf 33. Indeed, to prove defendant guilty of assault by a prisoner, the State was
required to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant intended to cause bodily injury
when he assaulted Murdock, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-102.5 (West 2004), which element
defendant disputed through Murdock's testimony. See TT:97-98, 216; see also Aplt. Br. at
13 ("The victim testified that the Defendant did not hit him and that his fingers rubbed across

11

his face.55). The threat evidence was thus highly probative and admissible to establish
defendant's intent, a relevant non-character purpose under Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of
Evidence, which authorizes admission of "other crimes, wrongs or acts . . . as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.55 Given his disputed intent, defendant does not—and could not successfully—assert
that admission of his threats violated rule 404(b).
Further, the State's need for the threat evidence was high not only because intent was
a pivotal trial issue, but because "the efficacy of alternative proof was very low.55 Decor so,
1999 UT 57, Tf 33. Murdock was a reluctant victim who ultimately testified in defendant's
behalf, minimizing defendant's conduct. See, e.g., TT: 194-195, 200, 202. Moreover, the
physical evidence of bruising was minimal and was as arguably consistent with an intent to
injure as not. See, e.g., TT:132, 161, 176, 194-195, 200, 202; see also State's Exh.## 2-3.
Accordingly, the threat evidence was highly probative of defendant's intent to injure
Murdock, but was not cumulative. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ^ 33. The State's case against
defendant would succeed or fail based entirely on whether the jury accepted the three
deputies' credibility regarding the fact of the assault itself and defendant5 s subsequent violent
threats. Thus, given the probative value of the threat evidence—and its necessity to the
State's case—the trial court correctly determined that the resulting prejudice was not unfair.
MHT:31;TT:182.
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Finally, "the degree to which the threat evidence was likely to unfairly prejudice the
jury was relatively minor." Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ^j 34. Because he was immediately
restrained, defendant was unable to carry out his threats against either Murdock or Deputy
Stewart. Therefore, although the threats were crude and likely made in order to provoke or
outrage Murdock and Deputy Stewart, they were not likely to inflame the jury or incite
overmastering hostility toward defendant. See State v. Jaimez, 817 P.2d 822,825 (Utah App.
1991) (holding Jaimez failed to show that probative value of his crude and outrageous
comments—that Officer Cowan had been cuckolded by defendant and that defendant had
fathered Mrs. Cowan's children—was outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice).
Notwithstanding the above, defendant relies on State v. Maurer, 11Q P.2d 981 (Utah
1989), to argue that his threats were improperly admitted. See Aplt. Br. at 8-12. In Maurer,
the Utah Supreme Court held that a letter written by Maurer to the murder victim's father
over a month after the murder was more prejudicial than probative and should have been
excluded from trial. Maurer, 110 P.2d at 983. Specifically, the court held that the majority
of Mauer's letter reflected his state of mind—not at the time of the murder—but at the time
he wrote the letter. Id. Therefore, Mauer's post-murder letter had very little relevance to the
pivotal issue at trial—his intent at the time he committed the murder. Id. Moreover, Mauer's
letter "displayed] his callousness toward the killing which he expresse[d] in profane and
vulgar language and manifested] his complete insensitivity to th[e] tragedy." A/. "The letter
taunt[ed] the victim's father and was designed to inflict guilt upon him and add to the grief
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he must have then been feeling." Id. Thus, the minimal probative value of Mauer's letter,
coupled with its highly inflammatory language, required that it be excluded under rule 403.
The Maurer court held, however, that a portion of the letter reflecting Maurer's state of mind
at the time of the murder was relevant and admissible. Id. That portion read: "'It was a great
feeling to watch her die. She kept crying "It hurts, It hurts." I should hope so, I mean it was
a 13 inch kitchen knife. Mike Bickley got to watch her die too. It was great.'" Id. at 982.
Defendant's threats to further harm and kill Murdock and to sexually assault and kill
Deputy Stewart are distinguishable from Mauer, primarily because they were made within
minutes—if not seconds—of the assault on Murdock. They were thus highly probative of
defendant's disputed intent during the assault. As set forth above, Mauer's vituperative letter
was written over one month after the murder and thus shed little probative light on his
feelings at the time he actually committed the murder. Further, defendant's unrealized
threats here were far less likely to inflame the jury or incite overmastering hostility toward
defendant than was the admissible portion of Mauer's letter—describing Mauer's elation in
watching his victim succumb to the fatal knife attack.
Given the broad discretion of the trial court in deciding issues of admissibility under
rule 403, and the fact that defendant's threats were highly probative of his intent when he
committed the assault moments earlier, the trial court's admission of the threat evidence was
not unreasonable. Evidence is clearly admissible when, as here, it is at least equally

14

probative of genuine issues as it is prejudicial. See State v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1141
(Utah 1989). The trial court's sound admissibility ruling should be upheld.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's jury conviction for assault by a prisoner should be affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
The State requests oral argument. "[0]ral argument is a tool for assisting the appellate
court in its decision making process," Perez-Llamas v. Utah Court of Appeals, 2005 UT 18,
^| 10, 110 P.3d 706, and "the only opportunity for a dialogue between the litigant and the
bench." Moles v. Regents of University of California, 187 Cal. Rptr. 557, 560 (Cal. 1982).
In the case at bar, the decisional process would "be significantly aided by oral argument."
Utah R. App. P. 29(a).
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED ON ^ ' September 2005.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

/MARIAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General

15

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I certify that on ^j_ September 2005,1 mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the BRIEF
OF APPELLEE to the following:
DEE W. SMITH
RICHARDS, CAINE & ALLEN, P.C.
2550 Washington Boulevard
Ogden,Utah 84401
Attorney for Appellant

Wtfa«-<fo4tJ&\-

16

Addendum

Page 1
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff,
Case Nos. 041100194;
041100002; 021100721
Transcript of Videotape,

vs
KIRK VAUGHN KELSEY,
Defendant

Transcript of Motion Hearing.
Honorable Gordon J. Low presiding,
First District Court Courthouse
Logan, Utah
November 18, 2004

APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff;

JAMES M. SWINK
Deputy County Attorney

For the Defendant:

JON J. BUNDERSON
Attorney at Law

RODNEY M. FELSHAW
Registered Professional Reporter
First District Court
P. 0. Box 873
Brigham City, UT 84302-0873
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE CQURTJS

ORIGINAL
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Page 31
1

things, Your Honor.

2

are in the report.

3

which don f t appear in the report.

4

away down the hallway after, well after, the altercation.

5

THE COURT:

Alleged threats to the officer, which
And alleged threats to Tyler Murdock,
Both are as he ! s being led

Threats to Tyler Murdock, to start with,

6

it strikes me are remarkably probative.

Remarkably.

7

Certainly they're prejudicial against your client.

8

wouldn't be offered if they weren't.

They

That's why they are

9 I used because they're prejudicial.
10

They are remarkably probative as to whether or not the

11

assault occurred and the mens re, if you will, of the

12

defendant at the time.

13

relate to the same exact thing.

14

set of outrage and threatening and hostile, that kind of mind

15

set is demonstrative to the jury as to what may have been the

16

situation a few minutes earlier when the alleged assault

17

occurred.

18
19
20
21
22

Threats to the officer may well
If your client is in a mind

After reading your memorandum and that of the state, I'm
prepared to deny your motion.
MR. BUNDERSON:

I suppose I could bring that up

again at the trial depending on -THE COURT:

Yeah, depending on what the

23

circumstances are.

I have some idea what the officer will

24

testify about, as do you.

25

conduct some discovery relative to those nonreported

You've had an opportunity to
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1

the record that you can think of that we've said off the

2

record that should be made part of the record?

3
4

MR. BUNDERSON:

I still have that continuing

objection to the post-event statements?

5

THE COURT:

Yes.

And I made a ruling on that.

6

offered you the opportunity to give the basis for it.

7

wisely said no.

8

elements of this offense is mental state.

9

can be demonstrated by circumstantial evidence.

I
You

The reason for that is because one of the
His mental state
The fact

10

that he was upset and said things are circumstances that

11

suggest what his mental state was at the time of and shortly

12

after the incident occurred.

13

I think they are evidence of what his mental state was both

14

at the time of the offense by the statements he made at that

15

point; and thereafter by the fact that he was angry and the

16 I statements made.

I think that goes to his mental state.

MR. BUNDERSON:

17

That's why I allowed them in.

I made objections in front of the

18

jury to Officer Stewart testifying to both of those things.

19

I did not object when Officer Anderson testified to those

20

things.
THE COURT:

21
22

exhausted that.

23

the jury.

24
25

I understand why.

Because you'd already

I don ! t think you had to again in front of

The same ruling would have been made.

MR. BUNDERSON:
standing objection.

As long as the court feels I have a

